A Comprehensive Reconstruction by Grok
The full text of “Toward a New World Order: The Future of NATO” by George Soros, dated 29 November 1993, is not directly available in a single accessible source within the provided references. However, I can piece together the key content and structure of the essay based on the detailed excerpts and summaries from reliable sources, including Soros’s own website and archived documents. Below, I’ll provide a comprehensive reconstruction of the essay’s main arguments, structure, and key passages, citing the sources used. If you need the verbatim full text, you may need to access the original pamphlet published by The Soros Foundations, which is referenced in multiple sources but not fully reproduced online in the provided results.
Reconstruction of “Toward a New World Order: The Future of NATO” by George Soros (29 November 1993)
Source Note: The following is synthesized from excerpts and summaries found in web sources, particularly from George Soros’s official website (), the Internet Archive (,), Scribd (,,), and other analyses (e.g.,,,). Direct quotes are included where available, and paraphrased content fills gaps based on consistent descriptions across sources. The essay was prepared for a conference on “Democracy, Peace and Security in the New Europe” (November 12–13, 1993) and revised afterward, published by The Soros Foundations, New York. – GROK
TOWARD A NEW WORLD ORDER: THE FUTURE OF NATO
by George Soros
29 November 1993
© November 1993 by The Soros Foundations
888 Seventh Avenue, New York, NY 10106
Tel: 212/757-2323 • Fax: 212/974-0367
Table of Contents (Inferred from Source Descriptions)
- The Coming World Disorder
- A Conceptual Framework
- A Theory of Revolutionary Change
- Open and Closed Societies
- A Diagnosis of the Present Situation
- The Need for Collective Security
- The Future of NATO
- Partnership for Peace – As Proposed
- A Real Partnership for Peace
- Problems of Economic Assistance
1. The Coming World Disorder
Soros opens by asserting that the global order post-World War II, characterized by two superpowers (the U.S. and Soviet Union) competing for dominance, has collapsed with the Soviet Union’s dissolution. This bipolar system, rooted in opposing principles of social organization, maintained stability through mutual enmity. The Soviet collapse, an internal development, has left a “security vacuum” that risks becoming a “black hole” of instability, particularly in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet states.
“It is clear that the world order that prevailed since the end of the Second World War has come to an end. It had been based on two superpowers vying for world domination. They stood for diametrically opposed principles of social organization and they considered each other mortal enemies.”
Soros argues that this shift caught both Soviet and Western leaders unprepared. While Gorbachev’s reforms aimed to transform the global order, Western leaders failed to seize the opportunity for cooperation, missing a chance to foster a stable transition.
2. A Conceptual Framework
Soros introduces a theoretical lens combining his “theory of revolutionary change” with the distinction between open and closed societies, concepts influenced by philosopher Karl Popper. He posits that during stable periods, perceptions align closely with reality, allowing institutions to adapt to people’s desires. However, in revolutionary times, such as the post-Soviet era, perceptions diverge significantly from reality, leading to unpredictable events.
“There are times when the discrepancy is relatively minor, and there is a tendency towards convergence between people’s views and the actual state of affairs. That is the case when prevailing institutions are flexible enough… But there are times when the discrepancy between perception and reality is very wide and shows no tendency towards convergence. On these occasions, the course of events follows a totally different pattern and the normal rules do not apply.”
This framework explains the chaotic transitions in post-communist states, where rapid changes outpaced societal and institutional adaptation.
3. A Theory of Revolutionary Change
Soros elaborates that revolutionary change occurs when participants’ thinking diverges from reality, causing events to spiral out of control. The Soviet collapse exemplifies this, as internal reforms led to unintended disintegration. He applies this theory to financial markets and geopolitics, noting that the West’s failure to anticipate or support the Soviet transformation exacerbated instability.
4. Open and Closed Societies
Soros defines open societies as those recognizing imperfect understanding, embracing pluralism, rule of law, and democratic governance. Closed societies, conversely, rely on dogma, nationalism, or authoritarianism, requiring enemies (external or internal) to maintain cohesion. The post-Soviet world risks reverting to closed societies, as communism’s collapse left nationalism as a unifying force in many states.
“Open society is based on the recognition … that participants act on the basis of imperfect understanding. Closed society on its denial.” “To constitute a closed society, you need to mobilize society behind the state. Since communism is dead and universal ideologies are generally discredited, a closed society needs to be based on a national or ethnic principle. To establish such a principle, you need an enemy; if you don’t have one, you need to invent it.”
Soros cites Serbia and Croatia as examples of emerging nationalist closed societies, warning that without intervention, this trend could dominate the region.
5. A Diagnosis of the Present Situation
The collapse of the Soviet empire has created a fragmented landscape. Some states, like Poland and Hungary, are progressing toward open societies, but even they risk reverting to pre-communist nationalist tendencies. Others are disintegrating or reconstituting as closed societies. Soros highlights the failure of Western aid to stabilize these transitions, dividing aid history into three phases:
- When aid should have been promised but wasn’t.
- When aid was promised but not delivered.
- When aid was delivered but ineffective.
“It should be recognized that providing economic assistance to the former Soviet Union has been an unmitigated failure.”
He warns that without proactive measures, the region faces economic collapse and nationalist dictatorships.
6. The Need for Collective Security
Soros argues that the United Nations, ideally a cooperative platform for superpowers, has failed as a collective security institution, particularly for U.S. troops. This leaves NATO as the only viable institution, untested but with potential to serve as the basis for a new world order in regions needing stability.
“The United Nations might have become an effective organization if it were under the leadership of two superpowers cooperating with each other. As it is, the United Nations has already failed as an institution which could be put in charge of U.S. troops. This leaves NATO as the only institution of collective security that has not failed, because it has not been tried.”
7. The Future of NATO
NATO’s original mission—to defend against the Soviet empire—is obsolete. The new threat is internal to the post-Soviet region, involving intra-state conditions and nationalist conflicts, not direct threats to NATO members. Soros proposes redefining NATO’s mission to project power and influence into the region, promoting open societies over closed ones.
“There is no direct threat from the region to the NATO countries; the danger is within the region, and it concerns conditions within states as much as relationships between states. Therefore, if NATO has any mission at all, it is to project its power and influence into the region, and the mission is best defined in terms of open and closed societies.”
This involves building democratic states and embedding them in structures that preclude nationalist or authoritarian behavior, with military intervention as a last resort.
8. Partnership for Peace – As Proposed
Soros critiques the U.S.-proposed Partnership for Peace (PfP), introduced for the January 1994 NATO summit, as a superficial initiative. It focuses on technical cooperation (e.g., joint exercises, peacekeeping, crisis management) with former Warsaw Pact countries but fails to address the region’s core security and economic needs. Central European countries seek full NATO membership for protection, particularly against a resurgent Russia, but the PfP’s vague promises risk escalating conflicts.
“The American proposal for the forthcoming NATO summit, the so-called Partnership For Peace, does not deal with this issue at all. It is a very narrow, technical proposal for holding common exercises and otherwise preparing for possible future cooperation with member countries of the former Warsaw Pact.”
9. A Real Partnership for Peace
Soros proposes a radically different PfP, not as a military alliance with automatic guarantees but as a broader coalition to foster open societies through political and economic engagement. This alliance would offer significant economic assistance to support democratic transitions, reducing the appeal of nationalism. He suggests NATO could invite any country to join, including Russia, to avoid antagonizing Moscow, though Russia would have to accept NATO’s expansion.
“The mission of this new kind of alliance is so radically different from the original mission of NATO that it cannot be entrusted to NATO itself. If it were, it would change NATO out of all recognition. A different kind of organization is needed, and the proposed Partnership For Peace could be that organization.”
Soros controversially notes that combining Eastern European manpower with NATO’s technical capabilities could enhance military potential, reducing casualties for NATO countries—a point later criticized as advocating Eastern Europeans as “cannon fodder.”
“The combination of manpower from Eastern Europe with the technical capabilities of NATO would greatly enhance the military potential of the Partnership because it would reduce the risk of body bags for NATO countries, which is the main constraint on their willingness to act.”
He also suggests including Japan in NATO to create a global architecture for open societies, with the U.S. as the leading superpower but acting collaboratively.
10. Problems of Economic Assistance
Soros reiterates the failure of Western economic aid to the former Soviet Union, emphasizing the need for a new approach. Aid must be tied to internal political developments, supporting democratic and market-oriented reforms. He advocates for an alliance that integrates military and economic strategies to ensure peace and security through successful transitions to open societies.
“The primary need is for constructive engagement in the transition to democratic, market-oriented, open societies. This requires an association or alliance which goes far beyond military matters and contains a significant element of economic assistance.”
Conclusion
Soros concludes by urging serious consideration of his proposal before the January 1994 NATO summit and President Clinton’s Russia visit. He acknowledges the short timeline but emphasizes the urgency of redefining NATO’s role to prevent global disorder. The essay reflects his personal views, not a conference consensus, and is framed as a call for “profound new thinking” to address the post-Cold War world’s challenges.
“I realize that time is short, but I hope my proposal will receive serious consideration prior to the NATO summit and President Clinton’s visit to Russia.”
The Conservative View:
From a conservative perspective, George Soros’s 1993 essay “Toward a New World Order: The Future of NATO” is viewed with skepticism and alarm. Critics see it as a blueprint for globalist overreach, advocating for a restructured NATO that prioritizes supranational influence over national sovereignty. Soros’s call for a “new world order” and his proposal to expand NATO’s role into fostering “open societies” through economic and political intervention raise red flags for conservatives who value limited government and national self-determination. His suggestion to integrate Eastern European manpower into NATO’s military framework is criticized as exploitative, potentially treating these nations as pawns in a Western agenda. Additionally, his emphasis on collective security and global alliances, including with Japan and potentially Russia, is seen as undermining U.S. autonomy and diluting NATO’s original defensive purpose. Conservatives argue this reflects Soros’s broader pattern of pushing progressive, borderless ideologies that clash with traditionalist principles of national security and independence.
To address the concerns raised by a conservative critique of George Soros’s 1993 essay “Toward a New World Order: The Future of NATO” and “turn around” the perceived globalist overreach, conservatives might advocate the following actions to realign NATO and global security policies with principles of national sovereignty, limited government, and traditionalist values:
- Reassert National Sovereignty in NATO’s Mission:
- Refocus NATO on its core defensive purpose: protecting member states from external threats, not intervening in the internal political or economic affairs of non-members. Amend NATO’s strategic framework to explicitly prioritize the sovereignty of member nations over supranational goals.
- Require unanimous consent from member states for any expansion of NATO’s role, ensuring smaller nations have a veto against globalist initiatives that could dilute their autonomy.
- Limit NATO’s Scope and Interventionism:
- Reject proposals to transform NATO into a tool for promoting “open societies” or engaging in nation-building. Conservatives would argue that such missions overstep NATO’s mandate and risk entangling alliances in costly, ideologically driven conflicts.
- Establish clear boundaries for NATO’s activities, restricting its involvement to military defense and excluding economic or political restructuring of non-member states.
- Strengthen U.S. Leadership with Accountability:
- Ensure U.S. dominance in NATO decision-making to safeguard American interests, but couple this with transparent oversight to prevent the alliance from serving globalist agendas. Congress could mandate regular reviews of NATO commitments to align with U.S. national security priorities.
- Oppose integrating non-traditional allies like Japan or Russia into NATO structures, preserving the alliance’s Western orientation and avoiding entanglements with unpredictable regimes.
- Protect Eastern European Nations from Exploitation:
- Counter Soros’s suggestion of using Eastern European manpower in NATO operations by prioritizing equal treatment of all member states. Ensure military contributions are voluntary and proportionate, with no nation treated as “cannon fodder.”
- Support Eastern European countries in building their own defense capabilities, fostering self-reliance rather than dependency on Western military frameworks.
- Promote Economic Independence Over Globalist Aid:
- Replace Soros’s vision of centralized economic assistance tied to political reforms with market-driven support. Encourage private investment and trade agreements that bolster post-communist economies without imposing ideological conditions.
- Advocate for bilateral aid programs controlled by donor nations, ensuring funds align with conservative values like free markets and minimal government interference, rather than supranational schemes.
- Counter Ideological Narratives:
- Actively challenge the “open vs. closed society” framework in international discourse, emphasizing that nations can maintain democratic governance and cultural traditions without adopting Soros’s universalist model. Promote a pluralistic view where diverse systems coexist without external pressure to conform.
- Support think tanks, media, and policy groups that articulate a conservative vision for global security, countering globalist influence in academic and diplomatic circles.
- Enhance Domestic Oversight of Global Institutions:
- Push for greater scrutiny of U.S. participation in NATO and other international bodies to prevent alignment with globalist ideologies. This could include legislative measures requiring detailed reports on how NATO initiatives impact American sovereignty and taxpayer resources.
- Encourage public debate on NATO’s evolution, ensuring conservative voices shape its future and counter narratives perceived as advancing a “new world order.”
By implementing these measures, conservatives could steer NATO back toward a narrowly defined, sovereignty-respecting alliance that prioritizes national interests and traditional security concerns over expansive, ideologically driven globalism. This approach would aim to preserve the alliance’s effectiveness while addressing fears of overreach articulated in critiques of Soros’s essay.